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Rich Schools, Poor Schools: The Promise of Equal Educational Opportunity. ARTHUR E. WISE. Chicago and London: University of
Chicago Press. 1968. Pp. xiv, 228. $9.00.
I received my copy of Arthur Wise's Rich Schools, Poor Schools
on the day the Supreme Court announced its decision in Mclnnis v.
Ogilvie,' a case from Illinois involving the very problem to which the
book is addressed. There the similarity ended. Whereas the book's thesis (so says the introduction) is that "the absence of equal educational
opportunity within a state, as evidenced by unequal per-pupil expenditures, ... constitute[s] a denial by the state of the equal protection
of its laws," the New York Times stated that "the Supreme Court
ruled today that it is not unconstitutional for states to spend more
money on public education in wealthy districts than is spent in poor
neighborhoods." 3 The contrast was as unsettling to me as it was apparent, since I am inclined to agree more with Mr. Wise than with the
Court.
Although the Mclnnis decision provides a somewhat unfavorable
climate in which to read Rich Schools, Poor Schools, the case should
not detract from the book's importance. Mr. Wise grapples with a problem whose solution is vital to the future of public education in the
United States-the existence in many states of gross inter-district inequalities in the availability of educational resources. This inequality
is a product of state allocation systems that leave local school districts
to depend on local property taxes as their major source of educational
revenues, thereby making the availability of funds largely a function
of the size of the local tax base. The problem is aggravated by the fact
that areas with smaller tax bases (per pupil), and thus with less access to
resources, are often the areas with the greatest educational needs. 4 The
struggle for funds is basically one between the central cities and the
suburbs, with the cities continually falling farther behind.5
1 394 U.S. 322 (1969), aff'g McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968). At
the time Mclnnis was decided, five other equal-educational-opportunity cases were in
progress in the lower courts. Board of Educ. of Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 20 v. Oklahoma, 286
F. Supp. 845 (W.D. Okla. 1968); Rodriguez v. San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist., 299 F. Supp.
476 (W.D. Tex. 1969); Burrus v. Wilkerson, Civil No. 68-C-13-H (W.D. Va., filed July
2, 1968); Serrano v. Priest, No. 938254 (Calif. Super. Ct., Los Angeles Co., filed Aug.
23, 1968); Detroit Bd. of Educ. v. Michigan, Gen. Civil No. 103342 (Mich. Cir. Ct.,
Wayne Co., filed Feb. 2, 1968).
2 P. 4.
3

N.Y. Times, March 25, 1969, at 1, col. 3 (city ed.).

4 See Campbell, Inequities of School Finance, SATURDAY RE iEw, Jan. 11, 1969, at 44.

5 The problem of matching resources to needs in education was created by a
redistribution of population in the United States. The result has been that poor,

152

BOOK REVIEWS

Everyone would probably agree that this problem should be primarily one for the state legislatures. But except for the traditional use
in many states of equalization grants which make slight inroads into
the problem, 6 legislatures have not acted to resolve inequalities in the
allocation of educational resources, and Mr. Wise does not believe that
they will. He compares the problem to legislative reapportionment,
which was finally accomplished only after Supreme Court intervention,
and suggests that similar action is necessary if equality of educational
opportunity is to be achieved. Thus Rich Schools, Poor Schools treats
equal educational opportunity as a constitutional issue arising under
the equal protection clause.
Wise contends that the present system of school financing allocates
resources essentially on the basis of wealth and geography, thereby
discriminating against children in poorer school districts. He argues
against this discrimination by weaving together three lines of authority
-the desegregation cases, 7 the indigent defendant cases, 8 and the reapportionment cases. 9 Just as discrimination in education on the basis of
race, discrimination in criminal proceedings on the basis of wealth,
and discrimination in legislative apportionment on the basis of geography are unconstitutional, so, argues the author, is discrimination
in education on the basis of wealth and geography unconstitutional.
While lawyers may find the long historical discussions by Mr. Wise
(a non-lawyer) of these three lines of authority0 rather elementary,
and his .legal reasoning somewhat oversimplified, 1 the argument is
nevertheless a good one. Unfortunately, essentially the same argument
was made in Mclnnis and was rejected by the district court, whose
2
opinion the Supreme Court summarily affirmed.'
less educated, non-white Americans are staying in the central cities, while higherincome, white families, and a substantial part of the industrial sector are moving
to the suburbs and taking their tax base with them.
Id.
6 Pp. 130-32, 197-98.
7 E.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 US. 483 (1954).
8 E.g., Douglas v. California, 372 US. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 US. 12 (1956).
9 E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 US. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Mr.
Wise also discusses the poll tax case, Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 US. 663
(1966), in conjunction with the reapportionment cases.
10 Pp. 11-92.
11 For more sophisticated legal discussions see Horowitz, Unseparate but UnequalThe Emerging Fourteenth Amendment Issue in Public School Education, 13 U.C.L.A.L.
REv. 1147 (1966); Brief for Urban Coalition as Amicus Curiae, Mclnnis v. Ogilvie, 394

US. 322 (1969).
12 The Supreme Court did not explain its affirmance since it wrote no opinion. Although the district court did discuss the precedent relied on by plaintiffs, it did so in
rather sketchy and conclusory terms indicating that "[t]he decided cases established significant, but limited principles." 293 F. Supp. at 334.
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The three-judge district court's opinion in Mclnnis is a broad one,
upholding the constitutionality of the Illinois school financing scheme
on alternative, grounds-it is neither arbitrary nor dis~riminatory so
as to violate the fourteenth amendment; and even if it were, the controversy is non-justiciable because of the lack of judicially manageable
standards.
The rationale behind the court's first holding is that the Illinois
school financing legislation reflects a rational policy of decentralization:
[T]he General Assembly's delegation of authority to school districts appears designed to allow individual localities to determine
their own tax burden according to the importance which they
place upon public schools. Moreover, local citizens must select
which municipal services they value most highly. While some communities might place heavy emphasis on schools, others may cherish police protection or improved roads. The state legislature's decision to allow local choice and experimentation is reasonable,
especially since the common school fund assures a minimum of
$400 per student.' 3
Wise flirts briefly with this question when he suggests that
equalization per se has no necessary implications for changes in
the control of public education. All that is implied by a policy of
equalization is a redistribution of school revenues .

. .

. Present

patterns of local control can be maintained under [such] a policy
14

But he does not convincingly dispose of the kind of argument made by
the Mclnnis court. 15 Nor does he discuss the legal doctrine of the "less
onerous alternative"' 6 which, if applied to the problem of school financing, would dilute the effectiveness of the local control argument by
establishing more strenuous equal protection standards to guide the
state.
In contrast to his cursory treatment of local control, Wise spends
considerable time on the problem of judicially manageable standards.
Whereas the Mclnnis court concluded that "the only possible standard
13 Id. at 383.
14 P. 206. See also p. 197.

15 For one possible refutation of the local control argument see Horowitz & Neitring,
Equal Protection Aspects of Inequalities in Public Education and Public Assistance Programs From Place to Place Within a State, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 787, 808-11 (1968).

16 Under this doctrine courts will sometimes inquire not merely whether there is a
rational or reasonable basis for differences in the treatment accorded different individuals, but whether there is a "less onerous alternative" by which the government's
purpose can be achieved in a manner which lessens the injury to individuals adversely
affected. See generally Horowitz, supra note 11, at 1161-66.
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is the rigid assumption that each pupil must receive the same dollar
expenditures," 17 Wise stresses that "it would be most unfortunate if
the present study were to be read as a call for 'one student, one dollar.' "18 He argues for flexibility and for the necessity of deviating from
an "equal dollars" principle in order to account for differences in the
cost of equivalent services in various parts of a state, differences in
costs attributable to economies of scale, and differences in the educational needs of the children served. 19
But Wise seems to speak of such deviations only as "permissible"
departures from an equal dollars standard. He does not answer the
20
more difficult questions, whether such deviations should be required,
and, if so, how all the variables can realistically be taken into consideration in allocating funds to local school districts. Nor does he mention
what is probably the most important variable of all-the differences in
the amounts of non-educational services provided by cities and suburbs
which compete with educational services for a share of the local tax
dollar.21 Because of this phenomenon of "municipal overburden,"
even if a city's per-pupil tax base were as large as that of its neighboring suburbs, the city would still find it considerably more difficult than
the suburbs to provide educational resources.2 2 This fact of life must be
taken into account before any effective equalization of educational
opportunity can be achieved.
Another aspect of the standards problem that Wise does not directly confront is the "put-the-lid-on" argument. If a state were required to equalize the educational resources of its.local school districts,
the per-pupil expenditure level of each district would be limited to the
17

293 F. Supp. at 335.

18 P. xiii.

19 Pp. 133, 159, 184, 200-06.
20 It has been argued, at least with respect to compensatory education, that additional funds for special programs should be constitutionally required. See Horowitz,
supra note 11, at 1166-72; Kirp, The Poor, The Schools, and Equal Protection, 38 HAv.
Enuc. Rxv. 635, 652, 665 (1968); cf. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 515 (D.D.C.
1967), afJ'd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
21 Cohen, The Economics of Inequality, SATURDAY RavVw, April 19, 1969, at 64.
[T]he central cities usually experience more than average competition for tax
dollars; they have more problems which local taxation is supposed to alleviate
(poverty, aging, ill health), and they provide services for people who work there,
but live elsewhere (fire and police protection, sanitation). Thus, a smaller proportion of the average property tax dollar is available for spending on schools in
central cities than in their neighboring suburbs.
Id.
22 Non-educational expenditures constitute 68 per cent of total public expenditures in the central cities of the thirty-seven largest metropolitan areas. The
comparable percentage for the suburbs is only 47 per cent.
Campbell, supra note 4, at 46.
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level of expenditure in the poorest or most miserly district; i.e., the
state would have to "put the lid on" (and in all likelihood decrease)
the amount of money which wealthier school districts could spend on
education.2 This would seem to be a difficult pill to take-and the
Mclnnis court specifically refused to swallow it.2 4 Yet Wise's silence

regarding this problem suggests that he is willing to take the pill, with
no real complaint or apology, as an unavoidable effect of equalization.
Unquestionably, the problem of judicially manageable standards
is an extremely difficult one. Wise's discussion of the problem and his
attempt to construct standards are very helpful-as far as they go. But
in chopping away at the trees, Wise may not have glanced hard enough
at the forest. For me, the most troubling aspect of the school finance
quagmire is not just that wealthier communities have more money per
pupil than poorer communities, but that they have more while taxing
themselves less. Although Wise recognizes this inverse relationship
between tax effort and per-pupil expenditures, 25 his equalization
proposals are not directed specifically at this aspect of the inequality
problem.
In contrast, I would focus more on equalizing "fiscal pain" than
on equalizing dollars-the purpose being not to give every school
district an equal number of dollars per pupil, but to insure that school
districts making similar tax efforts receive similar amounts of dollars
per pupil.2 6 This view of the problem makes it possible both to compensate for discrepancies in tax-base size 27 and to alleviate, by considering tax effort for non-educational expenditures, the problem of
municipal overburden. And educational excellence would not be unduly stifled by "putting the lid on" spending, since communities that
choose to tax themselves at higher rates would have more money
to spend.
Under this approach, a state could treat cost differences resulting
from varying regional price levels or economies of scale in whatever
manner it thought best. Differences in educational needs would con23 See Kurland, Equal Educational Opportunity: The Limits of Constitutional Jurisprudence Undefined, 35 U. CHi. L. R-v. 583, 590-92 (1968).
24 293 F. Supp. at 31 n.11, 336.
25 P. 127.
26 See Cohen, supra note 21, at 76.
27 For examples of how this might be accomplished consistently with the "equal fiscal
pain" principle, see the proposed legislation in the 1968 State Legislative Program of the
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations at 248-58, and the discussion of a
proposal by John Coons in Cohen, supra note 21, at 76-77. A similar proposal made by
Stephen Bailey is discussed in Rich Schools, Poor Schools. Pp. 204-06. Wise calls this
proposal "a specific compromise plan which might be acceptable to the courts .... " P. 204.
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tinue to be a problem, but, at least until the level of knowledge concerning their identification and treatment has increased, a state should
not be constitutionally compelled to provide additional funds for any
particular educational need. For the present it should be free, absent
a clear showing of discriminatory or arbitrary action, to identify the
special educational needs it wishes to serve and to treat them at the
state level or through a system of categorical grants. 2
Admittedly this is but a sketch of an approach to achieving equal
educational opportunity, and the extent to which it is constitutionally
viable in the aftermath of Mclnnis v. Ogilvie is by no means clear. But,
as Rich Schools, Poor Schools makes dear, the inequalities 'inherent in
existing methods of school financing are far too important to be forgotten; new approaches and new legal arguments for alleviating these
inequalities must continually be tested. Because it provides so useful
and thought-provoking a discussion of the concept of equal educational
opportunity and its many complexities-educational, legal, and political-Mr. Wise's book should play a significant role in this endeavor.
William A. Kaplin*
28 Wise makes a similar suggestion for giving preferred treatment to special educational needs. Pp. 183-84.
* Member of the District of Columbia Bar. A.B. 1964, University of Rochester; LL.B.

1967, Cornell University. Attorney, Education Division, Office of the General Counsel,
Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare. The opinions herein are the author's and do
not necessarily represent the views of HEW.

